Individuals' cognitive knowledge of their social networks is affected by systematic biases. This paper investigates the role of the mean degree bias, i.e. the tendency to underestimate the number of connections of others, in determining the structure of stable networks. It develops a strategic network formation model where agents have heterogeneous knowledge of the network: cognizant agents know the whole network, while ignorant ones are less knowledgeable and biased. For a broad range of parameters, all cognitively stable (CS) networks are small world networks with segregation patterns and brokers. There are also some CS networks with one hub.
Introduction
The structure of social networks is an important determinant of economic outcomes in a wide spectrum of settings including labor markets, provision of informal insurance, the generation and spread of innovations, disease epidemics, organizational performance and financial markets.
1 In order to harness benefits from the network, individuals strategically form and break connections to acquire an advantageous position in the social structure. Understanding how these strategic choices shape the emergence of social networks is of fundamental importance to explain the main structural properties of networks observed in empirical studies and to investigate the economic implications of these networks for single individuals and the society as a whole.
A critical characteristic of social networks is their complexity and the consequent difficulty individuals face in building a correct knowledge of the intricate pattern of social relations. For instance, a group of just 10 identical individuals can form 11, 716, 571 different connected network architectures. Dessi et al. [2012] show experimentally that subjects have an incomplete knowledge of their social network, their accuracy of perception is intrinsic to the individual, i.e. it does not depend on the exogenously assigned position of the individual in the network, and that they are affected by systematic biases. One of these biases is what we can dub the mean degree bias: on average individuals underestimate the number of connections of others in the network. The authors also show that the mean degree bias is present in two real social networks from previous survey-based empirical studies, which are part of a literature in sociology that investigates individuals' incomplete knowledge of their social networks. Moreover, both the empirical and experimental studies suggest that learning does not mitigate these findings.
The majority of strategic network formation models in the economic literature implicitly assume that agents have an accurate cognitive network, i.e. a complete knowledge of the network in which they are embedded. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the inclusion of agents with incomplete and biased cognitive networks matters for network formation. We investigate the stable networks in a strategic network formation model with two types of agents: cognizant agents who have complete knowledge of the network, and ignorant agents who are less knowledgeable and have a mean degree bias. For a broad range of parameters, we characterize the stable networks and show that all of them have some of the main structural properties observed in real social networks including small world features, segregation patters and the presence of brokers.
Specifically, we consider n agents exogenously partitioned into k communities. The cost of connecting for a pair of agents belonging to different communities is constant, and greater than the constant cost of connecting for a pair of agents in the same community. There are two types of agents: network cognizant (NC) agents, with complete knowledge about the network, and network ignorant (NI) agents, with partial and biased knowledge about the network. NI agents are able to see connections involving at least one agent from their own community, but they are not able to perceive connections involving agents from different communities. However, they know the connectivity of agents outside of their community with the caveat that they underestimate it by a factor β, which captures the mean degree bias found in the experimental and empirical work.
The model makes two important assumptions about agents' knowledge of the network, which are supported by the experimental evidence in Dessi et al. [2012] . First, it assumes that differences in individuals' cognitive networks depend on intrinsic cognitive ability and not, for example, on the individual's current location in the network so that the causality is from ability to perceive the network to network position. Second, it assumes the presence and it investigates the implications of a specific bias in the perception of network structure: the underestimation of the connectivity of other individuals. This bias alone captures only in small part the way in which individuals' cognitive networks are an incomplete representation of real social networks. However, the objective of the paper is not to formulate a general theory of how incomplete knowledge of the social environment matters for network formation, but to show that the inclusion of a simple, specific and experimentally validated bias in network perception is enough to lead to novel results on the structure of the stable networks that emerge. A strength of this approach is that the empirical and experimental evidence for the existence of this finding means that the results in this paper should be of particular relevance for applied work.
Agents derive their utility from the network, and the payoff structure is the distance-based utility introduced by Bloch and Jackson [2007] : links are costly, but direct and indirect connections bring benefits that decay with distance in the social network. The new component of the payoff structure introduced here is that individuals derive benefits from their cognitive net-work, which can differ from the real network structure. This change breaks the symmetry built into the payoffs of previous models, and it allows the emergence of a structurally rich class of stable network architectures.
We characterize the networks that are cognitively stable, which is an adaptation of the concept of pairwise Nash stability. A network is cognitively stable if there is no agent who, given his cognitive network, wants to sever one or more of his links and if there is no pair of unconnected agents who, given their cognitive networks, both want to connect to each other. In other words, a cognitively stable network is robust to simple deviations and it ensures that agents' choices are consistent with their perception of the social environment. Cognitive stability is a necessary condition for a network to be observed in reality because if a network is not cognitively stable then agents would want to deviate given their cognitive perception of their social environment. Thus, if we prove that all the networks that are cognitively stable satisfy certain structural properties then all networks that we actually observe in reality will necessarily have these properties.
For a broad range of the parameters, all the cognitively stable networks belong to a family of network architectures that are structurally richer and more realistic than equilibrium/stable networks previously characterized in the strategic network formation literature. Figure 3 .2 illustrates graphically three examples of these networks, which have two salient features. First, they have a kernel : a densely connected part of the network formed by the subset of NC agents who connect across communities. Second, in all these networks the NI agents connect exclusively with other agents in their own community. The communities are either complete networks, if the cost of links within the community is low, or d2 networks if the cost is high.
2 The proof involves two key steps: proving the claim that NI agents only form links within their community and showing that the problem is isomorphic to a simpler network formation problem involving only the NC agents.
In the last decade, studies in several disciplines have collected large amounts of evidence that the majority of social networks share common structural properties. Girvan and Newman [2002] highlight five main properties: All the cognitively stable networks in the model have properties (i),(iii) and (iv), plus property (ii) as long as there is a non-negligible number of communities with low cost of link formation. The NC agents are the brokers in the network: they strategically position themselves in the social structure to connect across communities thereby significantly shortening the average distance between any two individuals in the network. The high clustering coefficient is guaranteed by the presence of a non-negligible number of low cost communities. Finally, the NI agents connect exclusively within their own community causing the emergence of segregation patterns. For higher costs of link formation across communities, there are also some cognitively stable networks with a star kernel with properties (i)-(iv) and (v): the center of the star kernel is a hub.
These results illustrate the importance of individuals' knowledge of the network to understand the emergence of the structural properties commonly observed in social networks. It is important to point out that both the heterogeneity in the cost of forming links and the heterogeneity in the knowledge of the network play a role in the emergence of these stable network architectures. If only cost heterogeneity is present then non-trivial small world 3 A network with properties (i) and (ii) is called a small world network. Milgram [1967] was the first to investigate (i) with a famous experiment where, by using a letter chain, he showed that on average it took 5.2 intermediaries to connect two randomly chosen individuals in Nebraska and Boston. Recent studies on large networks that have confirmed the ubiquity of small world networks include and Kossinets and Watts [2006] .
4 See Currarini et al. [2009] for a review of the empirical evidence. 5 Burt [1992] presents extensive empirical evidence of (iii) and (iv). 6 Barabási and Albert [1999] point out (v) in many human and non-human networks. See Newman et al. [2006] for a comprehensive review. networks exist solely for the limit case where all communities have low cost of link formation.
7 Moreover, an example shows that there are stable networks without segregation patterns. If only knowledge heterogeneity is present then non-trivial small world networks do not exist. Moreover, an example shows that there are cognitively stable networks without segregation patterns and brokers.
The paper also explores the advantages (and disadvantages) of being knowledgeable about the network, and therefore it qualifies Burt's claim that being a broker brings an economic advantage. The formation of links across communities increases the payoffs of all the agents, but brokers receive a higher payoff than NI agents only if the communities are larger than a threshold size. Intuitively, if the communities are large enough then the net benefits the brokers receive from these communities are higher than the costless indirect benefits that the NI agents receive through the brokers.
The remaining part of this section surveys the related literature. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the stable networks. Section 4 shows that the stable networks have properties (i)-(v). Section 5 concludes, and Appendix A contains all the proofs. Dessi et al. [2012] is the first experimental study of individuals' ability to perceive a friendship network. Subjects have one minute to memorize a fictitious friendship network of 15 individuals. The network is represented using a graphical display which clearly indicates the subject's position in the group. After one minute the network disappears and the subjects have to answer questions on the structure of friendship relations in the group. The main findings are that subjects' perception of the network is incomplete, location has a minimal effect on perception and there are systematic biases. The two main biases are that subjects underestimate the mean degree in the network and they underestimate (overestimate) the number of frequent (rare) degrees in the network.
Related literature
The main empirical evidence on individuals' ability to perceive the social network in which they are embedded comes from survey-based studies in the social psychology literature. Krackhardt [1987] formalizes and applies the methodology that all these studies adopt: participants are asked to fill a network matrix in which entry (i, j) denotes whether they perceive that i is connected with j. The network matrix is the participant's cognitive network, and the real network is constructed from the aggregation of the individuals' cognitive networks. Kumbasar et al. [1994] use this methodology to map the cognitive friendship networks of the members of a professional group: they show that individuals' perception of the real network is inaccurate, it varies significantly across participants, and displays systematic and heterogeneous biases. Moreover, Krackhardt [1990] shows that accuracy in perception of a social network gives concrete advantages: the accuracy of an individual's perception of the advice and friendship networks in a 34-person organization is positively correlated with her influence in the organization as ranked by her colleagues. Dessi et al. [2012] analyze two cognitive friendship network datasets from Krackhardt [1987] and Casciaro [1998] to show that the two main biases that they find in the experiment are also present in these friendship networks from real settings. This paper is a contribution to the strategic network formation literature. Models of network formation are of two types: stochastic, mainly developed by physicists, and strategic, mainly developed by economists. Stochastic models of network formation have been very successful in reproducing the structural regularities found in large networks. For instance, the seminal paper by Watts and Strogatz [1998] shows that small world networks emerge for a broad set of parameters starting from a regular lattice and rewiring a few links with a probability p. A large literature has developed in physics to build richer models to explain the emergence of small world networks and other structural regularities such as power law degree distributions and correlations among nodes' degrees.
8 However, stochastic models have a major drawback: while they are very good at explaining how these structural properties emerge, they are silent on the why.
Strategic models of network formation are therefore complementary to the 8 Barabási and Albert [1999] is the seminal paper on the emergence of power law degree distributions. Dorogovtsev et al. [2000] generalize Barabási and Albert [1999] and find an exact solution to their model. Newman et al. [2006] is a comprehensive review of the work in physics on stochastic models of network formation. Jackson and Rogers [2007] and Kovarik and van der Leij [2011] are examples of stochastic models of network formation in the economic literature.
stochastic approach: they explain why network structures emerge as a result of the decisions of utility maximizing individuals. A major drawback of most of these models has been that equilibrium networks tend to have very stylized structures which are hardly representative of the structural characteristics of real social networks. Even the most complex equilibrium networks found in the literature still have a high degree of structural regularity, e.g. a number of star networks connected with each other. Moreover, essentially all the models in the literature are based on the assumption that all agents have complete and homogeneous knowledge about the network structure.
The paper that comes closest to the results in this work is Jackson and Rogers [2005] . They examine a special case of the model in this paper: a truncated version of the connections model with heterogeneous costs, where truncated means that indirect benefits are cumulated only up to a distance D. The pairwise stable networks in their model are a small subset of the stable networks found in this work, and they have properties (i)-(iv). However, their stable networks are very stylized and regular structures: completely connected communities with a few links across them. Property (i) is obtained directly from the assumption that indirect benefits are truncated at a distance D and property (ii) holds because all communities are the same and each agent is connected to all other agents in her community. On the other hand, the model presented here obtains property (i) without restricting the distance that indirect benefits can travel and property (ii) emerges in a setting where the community structure varies across communities allowing for the characterization of richer and more varied stable network structures. Moreover, in Jackson and Rogers [2005] 's model none of the stable networks have property (v) and their model does not say why any particular agent would be the one building the link across communities, i.e. it is silent on why certain individuals, rather than others, act as brokers. Galeotti et al. [2006] and Hojman and Szeidl [2008] build models with heterogenous costs of link formation, and they find that interlinked stars are one of the possible equilibria. Interlinked stars have properties (iii)-(v): each star is a community where the agents at the center of each star have a higher number of connections than other agents and act as brokers who connect to the center of other stars. However, these equilibrium networks, too, have a high degree of regularity: each community is a star with the link across communities generating from the center of the star. Interlinked stars clearly lack property (ii) of a small world network. Moreover, the equilibrium networks in Galeotti et al. [2006] lack property (i) if there are more than a few communities because the bound on the shortest distance is equal to twice the number of communities. As in Jackson and Rogers [2005] , property (i) in Hojman and Szeidl [2008] is obtained directly from the assumption that indirect benefits are truncated at a distance D.
McBride [2006a,b, 2008] investigates how the predictions of the standard network formation games change if all individuals only know the network up to a certain social distance. He adapts the concept of conjectural equilibrium to the context of network formation games and investigates the equilibrium networks and their welfare properties. In general, equilibrium networks are inefficient, but some of these inefficiencies can be eliminated with restrictions on actions or on beliefs about others' actions, and the welfare implications of increasing network knowledge depend on the exact network model. There is a large multiplicity of equilibrium networks and equilibrium refinements lead to a very stylized unique equilibrium, i.e. the center-sponsored star.
There are three main differences between this paper and McBride's work. First, we assume a specific form of incomplete network knowledge which is completely different from the specific form assumed by McBride. Our assumption is based on experimental and empirical evidence, while McBride's is mainly based on introspection. Second, in our model there is heterogeneity in agents' knowledge about the network, while McBride assumes that all agents have the same incomplete knowledge about the network. Third, we assume that individuals' payoffs depend on their cognitive, instead of the actual, network and characterize the cognitively stable networks, while McBride explicitly models agents' beliefs about the network and characterizes the equilibrium networks. This paper uses these ingredients to construct a model that shows that an experimentally and empirically validated form of incomplete knowledge of the network, which varies across individuals, leads to a set of stable networks where all networks have properties (i)-(iv).
The first contribution of this paper is to open a new route for the analysis of the importance of the cognitive perception of the network in economic models. The key innovation is the assumption that individuals' payoffs depend on the cognitive, rather than the real, network and the consequent formulation of a suitable concept of cognitive stability of a network. Here this framework allows the investigation of the role of the mean degree bias in network formation. The fact that this bias is present in both experimental and empirical investigations of cognitive networks makes the results in this paper particularly relevant for applied work. Moreover, the underlying framework can be applied to different network models and it can be used to explore other forms of network ignorance, so the specific focus of this paper is just an example of a large number of potential applications.
The second contribution is to construct a strategic network formation model where, for a broad range of the parameters, all stable networks have a rich structure with properties (i)-(iv). Moreover, property (v) is present in some stable networks. This is the first model of strategic network formation that derives stable networks with all the above properties and where the presence of these properties is not just due to very stylized stable networks.
The third contribution is to show that incompleteness and heterogeneity in individuals' knowledge of the network plays a key role for the emergence of some of these properties. The agents with complete knowledge of the network are the brokers who connect across communities shortening the distance between any two individuals in the network. The NI agents connect exclusively within their own community leading to the emergence of segregation patterns.
The Model
This section presents the main elements of the model: the network notation and terminology, the payoffs, the assumptions on the knowledge agents have about the network, and the stability concept used in the analysis.
Networks. Consider a set of n agents N = {1, ..., n}, and partition it into k ≥ 2 subsets such that
Assume that m i ≥ 3 to avoid trivial subsets. The term community will be used to denote the M i subsets. A network is represented by a symmetric matrix g ∈ {0, 1} n×n , with g ij = 1 denoting that i and j are connected. The cognitive network of an agent i is represented by a symmetric matrix g i ∈ {0, 1} n×n , with g i jk = 1 denoting that agent i perceives that j and k are connected: an agent's cognitive network is therefore the agent's perception of the underlying network structure.
Consider
Denote by β ∈ [0, 1) a factor that will capture the mean degree bias. A path p ij (g) between i and j in a graph g is a set of links
. The length of a path is |p ij (g)|, if there is no path between i and j then the length is infinite. The geodesic distance d ij (g) between i and j in g is the minimum number of links that need to be used along some network path to connect i and j. If there is no such path, then d ij (g) = ∞. The diameter D(g) of a network g is the maximum geodesic distance in g. A network is connected if there is a path of finite length between any two nodes i and
The term network architecture refers to the geometric properties of a graph, and permutations of agents do not generate different architectures. There are special network architectures that will frequently arise. The complete network is the network g C = {g|g ij = 1 ∀i, j ∈ N }. The empty network is the network g ∅ = {g|g ij = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N }. A star network g * is a network where, for some agent i, all agents j = i are connected to i and there is no other link in the network. Analogously, a community M i is a complete community if all the agents in M i are directly connected to each other. A community is a star community if, for some agent i ∈ M i , all agents j = i (j ∈ M i ) are connected to i and there is no direct link between any other two agents in M i . The set G = {g|g ⊆ g C } is the set of all possible networks. The shorthand notation g IN DEX denotes a family of network architectures with similar structural properties. For instance, g d2 = {g|d ij (g) ≤ 2 ∀i, j ∈ N and ∃i, j ∈ N such that d ij (g) = 2}. In other words, g ∈ g d2 if any two nodes in g are at a maximum geodesic distance of two and at least a pair of nodes is not directly connected. Clearly, g * ∈ g d2 and g C / ∈ g d2 . Analogously, a community M i is a d2 community if, considering only paths involving agents in M i , any two agents in M i are at a maximum geodesic distance of two and at least a pair of agents is not directly connected.
Payoffs. Agents derive utility from a network according to the distancebased payoff structure first introduced by Bloch and Jackson [2007] :
where b(.) is a non-increasing function and c ij is the cost to agent i of linking with j. Agents receive a benefit and pay a cost for direct connections, and they also receive benefits (weakly) decaying with distance from indirect connections. Note that agents only pay the cost for links that are actually formed. For instance, consider a network formed by three agents i, j, k such that g ij = g jk = 1 and g ik = 0. Assuming all the agents have complete knowledge of the network, the payoffs are:
Clearly, the connections model and the truncated connections model in Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] are special cases of these payoffs. The only departure from the literature is that the utility for agent i depends on g i , i.e. i's cognitive network, and not the real network g. Thus, agents with less knowledge about the network will be able to extract less benefits from it. This has an intuitive interpretation. Imagine i and j are connected because they do the same job and they usually communicate on work-related issues. Also, j happens to be connected to k because they were roommates in college, and k's family friend l is a renowned producer on Broadway. However, i does not know that k and l are connected. Agent i would love to go to the première of the much awaited new Broadway show of the season. If she knew that g kl = 1 then she would subtly mention it to j, hoping that he would ask k whether his friend l has any spare VIP invitations. However, g i jk = 0 so she would never think of raising the subject with her colleague j, and therefore i will have to miss the première and the VIP party. This short story illustrates that there are some benefits from the network that need to be prompted, and that an individual cannot have access to them unless she knows the network structure.
Knowledge. First of all, a note on terminology. In this paper cognitive knowledge of a network should be interpreted as the individual's "mental picture" of the network that she is embedded in. This knowledge is exogenously given and it captures an individual's cognitive ability to perceive the pattern of connections surrounding her.
Assume there are two types of agents in the network with complete and partial knowledge about the underlying network structure. Specifically, the types of agents are:
all the nodes and links in the network g, i.e. g i ≡ g. Let the kernel K ⊂ N be the subset of NC agents in the network.
(ii) Network Ignorant (NI): an N I agent i ∈ M p has complete knowledge about any link g jk where j ∈ M p and/or k ∈ M p , but she is not able to see any link g jk such that j, k / ∈ M p . Moreover, she perceives that the community degree of agent j / ∈ M p is equal to βd M j (g) . An NI agent is unable to perceive the exact network structure for connections which do not involve at least one agent from her own community. However, she is able to perceive the number of connections that an agent in another community has with members of his community, although she underestimates the number of connections by the mean degree bias β. For simplicity and tractability purposes we assume throughout the paper that the mean degree bias β is the same for all NI agents.
Stability. We are interested in characterizing the networks that are stable given the agents' cognitive perception of the network, and to this purpose we define a novel stability concept.
Definition 1. The network g is a cognitively stable network if and only if:
and
In a cognitively stable network there is no agent who wants to sever one or more of her links, and there is no pair of agents who both (at least one of them strictly) want to form a new connection.
A network which is cognitively stable satisfies a basic requirement for stability: it ensures that individuals do not want to deviate given their knowledge of the network structure. In other words, in a cognitively stable network the agents' choices are consistent with their cognitive perception of the network. Cognitive stability is a necessary condition for a network to be observed in reality because if a network is not cognitively stable then agents would want to deviate given their cognitive perception of their social environment. Thus, if we prove that all the networks that are cognitively stable satisfy certain structural properties then all networks that we actually observe in reality will necessarily have these properties.
However, we cannot claim that cognitive stability is a sufficient condition for a network structure to be observed in equilibrium. A full-fledged characterization of the equilibrium networks would require an analysis of the belief systems which are consistent with agents' cognitive networks and the definition of a suitable equilibrium concept. Here we do not embark on this analysis because the objective of this paper is to show that a specific form of network ignorance, which is validated by experimental and empirical findings, is important to explain the structural properties of the networks that we observe in reality. The cognitive stability concept suffices for this purpose and its simplicity allows us to characterize a rich family of stable network architectures.
Stability Analysis
This section characterizes the cognitively stable networks. Section 3.1 lists and motivates some simplifying assumptions to the set-up of the model for both expository and tractability purposes. Section 3.2 characterizes all the cognitively stable networks for a broad range of the parameters of the model when the mean degree bias is zero. Section 3.3 shows that the cognitively stable networks are the same when the mean degree bias is present. Section 3.4 investigates the economic implications of the stable networks for the different types of agents.
Assumptions and motivation
As the literature review in section 1 discusses, the characterization of stable networks for network formation games with heterogeneous agents is not easily tractable without some simplifying assumptions. Moreover, it is important to reduce the heterogeneity in the model to zoom in on the role of heterogeneity in cognitive knowledge of the network. Thus, for tractability and expository purposes, assume the following: Assumption (a) is for expository purposes only: section 5.1 in Gallo [2009] , which is the extended working paper version of this paper, shows that it is not necessary for the main results to hold. Assumptions (b), (c) and (d) make the model more tractable. The cost structure in (d) has an intuitive interpretation. The internal costs of connections are homogeneous within a community, but they vary depending on the type of community. Moreover, costs of connections across communities are more costly than the internal ones within a community. This captures the fact that a bond between two individuals in the same community is easier to establish because people in the same community are similar, while it requires more effort to bond with someone from another community who has different characteristics.
Figure 1: Nodes with the same color belong to the same community. Roundshaped nodes are NI agents, and diamond-shaped nodes are NC agents. In (a) and (b) there is maximal separation of agents from their communities in both the white and black networks. In (c) there is maximal separation of agents in the white community.
Why is there the need of introducing heterogeneity both in costs and in the knowledge that agents have about the network? Intuition may suggests that either heterogeneity in costs or in knowledge should suffice to ensure that in any stable network agents connect mainly with other agents in their own community, i.e. the network has segregation patterns. 9 The following examples show that this intuition is not true: if only one form of heterogeneity is present then there are stable networks without segregation patterns.
Example 1 -Heterogenous knowledge with homogeneous costs Assume (b)-(c) hold, but costs are homogeneous, i.e. c ij ≡ c, ∀i, j ∈ N . It is relatively easy to construct stable networks where there is maximal separation of agents from their communities, i.e. each agent is connected with all the individuals in other communities and with none in her own. Figures  1(a) and 1(b) are examples of such networks. It is straightforward to check that they are cognitively stable networks in the b(1) − b(2) < c < b(1) − b(3) range. Architectures with maximal separation are stable because they help NI agents in perceiving the network: there is no black-black (or white-white) link so every white (or black) NI agent can perceive any link in the network since any link involves one white (or black) agent. Thus, if one takes away the cost differential there are stable networks without segregation patterns. 
Clearly in this network all agents in the white community are separate from each other.
10 Thus, if one takes away the knowledge differential, then there are stable networks without segregation patterns.
9 Section 4 gives a formal definition of segregation patterns, but for now think of a network with segregation patterns as a network where most links are within instead of across communities.
10 A reviewer made the interesting observation that in the network in Figure 1 (c) agents in the white community who have higher intra-community costs of link formation fail to segregate because they exploit the high connectivity of other communities. This may provide an explanation of why some communities open up while others are more inward which has not been investigated so far in network formation models with heterogeneous costs.
These examples give us a hint that the presence of both types of heterogeneity leads to different predictions about the stable networks than the presence of either type alone. After characterizing the stable networks in the following section, it will be enlightening to come back to these examples and compare them to the stable networks that are supported when both types of heterogeneity are included.
Cognitively stable networks: β = 0
For expository purposes it is useful to first consider the extreme case of a mean degree bias equal to zero, i.e. β = 0. This is an extreme form of network ignorance: the NI agent is unable to perceive any intra-community link in other communities and she assumes that agents that are not connected to anyone in her own community are social isolates. Section 3.3 will show that the cognitively stable networks for this extreme case are the same as the general case of a positive mean degree bias β ∈ (0, 1), so it is helpful to start from the β = 0 case to understand the argument of the proofs.
The following lemma is a key step in characterizing the cognitively stable networks: it shows that the combination of heterogeneity in costs and in knowledge of the network leads the less knowledgeable agents to connect exclusively within their own community. The intuition of the proof is as follows. If costs of connections c i within communities are low, i.e. c i < b(1) − b(2) for i = 1, ..., k, then the result is straightforward because all communities are complete networks and NI agents cannot get any indirect benefits from inter-community links. If costs c i are higher, i.e. b(1) − b(2) < c i < b(1) − b(3) for i = 1, ..., k, then the proof is ad absurdum. Assume that there exists a link between two agents i and j belonging to different communities and that i is NI. In order for i not to want to sever this link at least one agent k belonging to i's community has to be connected with j. Moreover, there cannot be another agent l directly connected to both i and k, otherwise i would not need the link with j to gain benefits from the indirect connection with k. The proof shows that it is not possible to construct a stable network satisfying these requirements, and therefore the link g ij cannot exist in a stable network.
The lower bound C on the cost of inter-community links excludes the possibility of small loops that could help sustain a link between i and j. There are two types of small loops that have to be excluded. First, consider a circle network with 5 agents such that: agents 1-4 belong to community U i , agent 5 belongs to community U j , agent 4 is NI and g 45 = 1. The net benefits for 4 to remove the link with 5 are C − b(1) − b(2) + b(3). Second, consider a circle network with 6 agents such that: g k,k+1 = 1, agents 2, 4, 6 belong to community U i , 4 is NI, and agents 1, 3, 5 belong to community U j . The net benefits for 4 to remove the link with 5 are
Thus, if the lower bound in the statement of the lemma does not hold then NI agent 4 would like to keep a link with an agent 5 from another community.
The upper bound c on the cost of intra-community links ensures a minimum level of cohesion within communities: no agent is more than two links away from another agent belonging to her community. Without this minimum level of cohesion there might be stable networks where NI agents "infiltrate" another community due to its very sparse structure.
Some more notation and terminology before characterizing the cognitively stable networks. (ii) a complete kernel with mixed complete and d2 communities, denoted
(iii) a complete kernel with d2 communities, denoted
The proof involves several steps. Lemmata 2 and 3 are technical and they were first proved in Calvó-Armengol and Ilkiliç [2010] . They show that it is possible to use cognitive pairwise stability to characterize the cognitively stable networks. Cognitive pairwise stability is a weaker stability concept than cognitive stability because it only requires to check that there is no agent who wants to sever a single link, instead of any subset of links as required by cognitive stability. Lemma 2 states that the utility defined in (1) is superadditive in own-links. This superadditivity condition means that the marginal utility to an agent i from a subset of links already present in the network is higher than the sum of the marginal utilities from each of the links separately. Lemma 3 states that this condition matters because if u(.) is superadditive then the set of pairwise cognitively stable and cognitively stable networks coincide. Computationally, cognitive pairwise stability is a much easier condition to prove because it only requires to check for onelink deviations: unilateral in case of link severance and bilateral for link formation.
By lemma 1 the NI agents do not form any link with agents outside of their community. Using this result it is easy to see that communities M i with low costs of link formation c i < b(1) − b(2) are complete communities and communities M j with high costs of link formation b(1)−b(2) < c j < b(1)−b(3) are d2 communities. Finally, the last step is to characterize the structure of the kernel K of NC agents that form links across communities. At this stage one can show that the network formation game is isomorphic to a simpler network formation game with K agents and heterogeneous benefits. Lemma 4 characterizes the cognitively stable networks of the simpler network formation game, which by the isomorphism are the same as the ones of the original game. Specifically, the benefit of forming a link with an NC agent is in the [B(1), B(1)] range, because communities are either g C or g d2 , and the kernel is a complete network, because C < B(1) − B(2). Hereafter, the cognitively stable networks in proposition 1 will be denoted as g CK , or cognitively stable networks with complete kernel. Figure  2 (b) the variety of structures that the d2 communities can have: the dark gray and black communities are stars with the NC agent at the periphery, the white community is a star with the NC agent at the center, and the light gray community is a hexagon with diagonals. Adopting, for now, an informal definition of a network with segregation patterns as a network where most links are within instead of across communities, it is clear that the g CK networks have segregation patterns. In order to pinpoint the role played by the two types of heterogeneity present in the model, it is useful to return to examples 1 and 2 in the previous section. 
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These two examples show that both heterogeneity in costs and in knowledge are necessary to sustain the g CK cognitively stable networks. Without either type of heterogeneity g CK networks are not stable and there are cognitively stable networks that do not have segregation patterns. The cost differential ensures that there are higher net benefits from direct connections with agents in one's own community. The knowledge differential leads the network ignorant agents to underestimate the indirect benefits they would obtain by connecting with agents in other communities, and therefore NI agents connect exclusively within their community leading to the emergence of segregation patterns. Section 4 will show that g CK networks are quite interesting because they have, at least in stylized form, some of the main properties observed in real social networks.
The characterization of stable networks for higher costs C > B(1) − B(2) of inter-community links is more difficult' because there are multiple stable architectures for the kernel. This multiplicity of stable networks is a wellknown result since Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] . If C < B(1) − B(3) then the kernel will be a d2 network, but if C > B(1) − B(3) then there can be different stable architectures. Among these stable networks there are some with a star kernel that are interesting because, as the following section will discuss, they have one agent with a much higher degree than all the others.
11 Note that there is one limit case where g CK architectures are stable networks for a narrow parameter range without the knowledge differential. This is when all internal community costs c i are so low that all communities are complete communities. The case with two communities is analyzed in Jackson and Rogers [2005] .
Corollary 1 characterizes these networks. (ii) a star kernel with mixed complete and d2 communities, denoted
(iii) a star kernel with d2 communities, denoted
The proof follows closely the one of proposition 1, and it provides no new intuition. The network architectures are similar to the ones in Figure 3 .2 with the only difference being that the diamond-shaped NC agents form a star instead of a complete kernel.
Cognitively stable networks: β > 0
The previous section makes the strong assumption that agents have an extreme form of the mean degree bias so they perceive agents in other communities to be social isolates. Here we relax this assumption and show that the results do not change if agents have a positive bias β ∈ (0, 1), which is the bias that Dessi et al. [2012] find in both experimental and empirical data.
Consider an NI agent with bias β who belongs to community M p and who is considering a link with an agent j from a different community M q . Assume that j has no connections with members of M p and that he has x connections in M q . The expected benefits for i to connect to j are clearly equal to b(1) + βb(2)x. The maximum value for x occurs when j belong to a complete community or he is at the center of a star community. Thus, the maximum expected benefits for i to connect to an agent j from another community are equal to b(1)+βb(2)(m−1). Denote by EB max ≡ βb(2)(m−1) the maximum expected indirect benefits for an NI agent.
In addition to the ignorance, there is some degree of bounded rationality in the specification of the NI agents. First, NI agent i does not try to figure out the second order degree distribution of another community, i.e. the value of the expected indirect benefits of connections that are two links away from an agent she is considering whether to connect to. Second, agents do not know and they are not able to figure out whether other individuals are NI or NC. Note that all these assumptions are plausible if communities are relatively large.
The following proposition is the equivalent of proposition 1 for the case of NI agents with a positive mean degree bias. (ii) a complete kernel with mixed complete and d2 communities, denoted
These cognitively stable network architectures are exactly the same as the networks characterized in proposition 1. The only difference from proposition 1 is that the range of values allowed for the cost C is narrower since, by definition, EB max > 0. This makes intuitive sense: as the knowledge available to NI agents increases (i.e. β increases), it becomes more difficult to sustain cognitively stable networks where the NC agents use their better knowledge to acquire a strategic position as brokers among different communities. Note that if EB max is high enough then these cognitively stable networks may not exist.
The advantages and disadvantages of knowledge
A simple inspection of the cognitively stable networks in proposition 2 highlights that agents occupy different positions in the network according to their knowledge. More knowledgeable NC agents position themselves at the center of the overall network structure connecting with each other to form the "kernel" of the network. Less knowledgeable NI agents remain at the periphery, insulated within their own community. By comparing the payoffs of NC and NI agents it is therefore possible to explore what are the advantages (and disadvantages) of network knowledge.
Before proceeding, an important caveat. In the analysis conducted in the previous sections the NI agents base their linking decisions on their cognitive network. As discussed after equation (1) in section 2, the cognitive network is what matters for some of the payoffs an agent receives, e.g. i is not able to get the VIP invitation unless she knows the path leading to l. However, other types of indirect network benefits flow in the network without any need of being prompted. Thus, in the g CK cognitively stable networks the NI agents will receive (weakly) higher payoffs from the network than the payoffs they compute given their knowledge of the network. There are different potential explanations of why they do not realize this and change their linking decisions. One of these explanations is that benefits that flow in a network are very intangible and NI agents are not able to pin down the payoff discrepancy. Another one is bounded rationality: they are not able to see where the benefits come from and they are not able to infer it. If this is the case then the payoffs of the NI agents from the actual network can be a useful upper bound on the effective payoffs they receive. The payoffs from the actual network are the ones we will consider for the analysis in this section.
The following corollary to proposition 2 compares the payoffs NC and NI agents receive in the g CK networks.
Corollary 2. Consider NC agent i ∈ M i and NI agent j ∈ M i and any network g ∈ g CK , then we have that:
The proof computes the benefits to NC and NI agents in the g CKC and g CKS network architectures, which are the subsets of g CK networks in which all communities are complete and star networks (with the NC agent at the periphery) respectively. g CKC and g CKSP network architectures are the two extreme cases that give the highest benefits to the NI and NC agents respectively. g CKC networks favor NI agents because all of them are directly linked to NC agents thereby minimizing the geodesic distance from NI agents to agents in other communities and maximizing the costs that NC agents have to pay to be linked to their own community. On the other hand, g CKS architectures favor NC agents because each one of them is linked to one NI agent in her community thereby maximizing the geodesic distance from NI agents to agents in other communities and minimizing the costs that NC agents have to pay to be linked to their own community. In the other g CK cognitively stable architectures the difference in payoffs between NC and NI agents falls in between these two extremes: star communities with the NC agent at the center and d2 communities balance the trade-offs above; g CKM networks are clearly combinations of g CKC and g CKd2 networks. Intuitively, an agent knowledgeable about the network receives higher payoffs in a society in which the communities are formed by a large number of agents. In this type of society the net benefits that the NC agent obtains by being close to the agents of other communities are very large and they are higher than the benefits obtained by the NI agents who are farther away from other communities. On the other hand, the NC agent receives lower payoffs in a society in which the communities are formed by a small number of agents. In this type of society the benefits that the NC agent obtains by being close to the agents of other communities are small so, once the costs of keeping these links are taken into account, the net benefits to the NC agents are lower than the benefits obtained by the NI agents who are farther away from other communities.
As section 4.2 will discuss more formally, the NC agents are the brokers in the cognitively stable networks in proposition 2. The statement in corollary 2 therefore qualifies Burt's claim that being a broker is beneficial. A broker receives higher payoffs due to her position in the network structure if she is part of a society in which communities are larger than a threshold size. On the other hand, in a society in which communities are below a threshold size the brokers receive lower payoffs than other agents in their community.
Structural properties of stable networks
This section shows that stable networks have properties (i)-(v) listed in the introduction. Section 4.1 shows that essentially all cognitively stable networks with a complete kernel are small world networks. Section 4.2 shows that all cognitively stable networks with a complete kernel have segregation patterns and that the brokers are the network cognizant agents. Section 4.3 shows that some of the cognitively stable networks have one hub.
Small world networks
Before giving the formal definition of a small world network, it is necessary to introduce two new concepts.
The first one is the clustering coefficient of a network. In the network literature the clustering coefficient of a node of a network is the fraction of its neighbors that are also directly linked to each other. The average clustering coefficient C(g) of a network g is defined as:
The average clustering coefficient of a network is simply the average of the clustering coefficients of all its nodes.
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The second one is a particular type of networks called random networks, which have been the subject of extensive study in the graph theory literature. It is not difficult to generate a random network: following the seminal papers by Rényi [1959, 1960] , let G n,p be the set of all networks consisting of n vertices where each pair is connected together with uniform probability p. In order to generate a network sampled uniformly at random from G n,p follow this process: take n initially unconnected vertices and go through each pair of them, joining the pair with an edge with probability p.
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In the Erdős-Rényi model, and in many other random graph models, when the number of nodes is large the average geodesic distance has approximately the same magnitude as the ratio of the logarithm of the total number of vertices in the graph to the logarithm of the average degree of a node. Mathematically,d(g random ) ≈ log(n)/log(z) where z = n i=1 n j=1 g ij /n is the average degree of a node in g. This approximation holds as long as the 12 Note that this is not the only clustering coefficient metric in the network literature. Apart from measures for directed networks, another popular clustering coefficient measure is the total clustering coefficient C T (g). The latter is the overall fraction of "triangles" in the network, i.e. C T (g) is not computed node by node and then averaged out, but directly for the whole network. Newman [2003] shows these measures can be very different for certain networks. For the rest of this paper, "clustering coefficient" will mean C(g). However, the results will apply to C T (g) as well, except for a few special cases of network structures.
13 Several generating processes for random networks have been the subject of extensive study and for a broad spectrum of generating processes the resulting networks share the same general properties in terms of average geodesic distance and clustering coefficient. See Bollobás [2001] for an extensive review.
average degree of a vertex is greater than one and it is significantly smaller than n, i.e. as long as the number of links is not so small that the network is disconnected in many small components and as long as the number of links is not so large that the network is close to be a complete network. Moreover, the clustering coefficient C(g random ) of a random graph with n nodes tends to zero as n becomes very large.
Following Watts [1999] , the formal definition of a small world network is as follows.
Definition 2. A network g is a small world if: (i) it has short average geodesic distance. More precisely, the average geodesic distance is similar to the one of a randomly generated network with the same number of nodes and the same average degree, i.e.
(ii) it has a higher clustering coefficient compared to the one of a randomly generated network. More precisely,
The following proposition shows that the majority of g CK cognitively stable networks are small world networks.
Proposition 3. For any g CK cognitively stable network in proposition 2 we have that:
(ii) if λ < 0.95 and n < 10
(iii) a lower bound on the clustering coefficient is lim m,k→∞ C(g CK ) = 1−λ.
The derivation of the results is by inspection of the g CK architectures. Statements (i) and (ii) show that g CK networks have the first property of a small world, i.e. an average geodesic distance comparable to the one of a random graph with the same number of nodes and links. Statement (iii) shows that as long as there is a non-negligible fraction of complete communities, i.e. λ < 1, then g CK networks have the second property of a small world: a non-negligible clustering coefficient. These results show that small world networks are prevalent in the broad parameter range where the stable networks are g CK networks.
It is important to point out that, even though g CK networks have a rich and varied structure, they are still "stylized" small world networks. This is evident in statements (i) and (ii): there is an upper bound of 5 to the diameter, which limits the validity of statement (ii) to networks with less than 100,000 nodes. As it is clear from definition 2, small world networks can be defined for any number of nodes. This is an indication that for very large networks this model starts to break down because an even more complex structure is needed. A potential avenue to explore would be to have the communities be grouped into larger communities that interact to form even larger communities.
Intuitively, all g CK networks in proposition 2 that have a non-negligible fraction of communities with low costs of link formation are small world networks. The requirement to have a few low cost communities is necessary for the clustering coefficient to be bounded away from zero. In the limit, the clustering coefficient of a random network goes to zero while the clustering coefficient of a g CK network does not, as long as λ < 1. Finally, note that for (iii) to hold it is not necessary that both parameters m and k are very large, either of them would suffice.
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The presence of agents with complete knowledge about the network is key for the emergence of the first property of small worlds. The NC agents provide the few links across different communities that dramatically shorten the social distance between any two individuals in the network. The presence of a few close-knit communities with low costs of link formation, where everyone is connected to everyone else, is enough for the emergence of the second property of small world networks.
To sum up, both heterogeneity in costs and heterogeneity in knowledge determine the first property of a small world network: a short average distance between individuals in the network. Moreover, heterogeneity in costs is key to have the second property: an average clustering coefficient bounded away from zero due to the presence of communities with low cost of link formation.
Segregation patterns with brokers
A prominent characteristic of social networks is that they show segregation patterns. Intuitively, individuals of the same type stick together in closeknit communities and they form very few links outside of the community. A classical example is racial segregation patterns in US urban areas. Moreover, these close-knit communities are connected by a few agents, called brokers, who strategically position themselves in the social network structure to bridge different communities.
A basic metric to measure the extent of segregation of an individual i ∈ M p is the fraction of i's connection that are with members of her community M p . Averaging the segregation of all the agents in M p gives a measure of the overall segregation of the M p community.
15 Formally, the segregation index S p of a community M p is equal to:
The higher is this ratio, the more segregated is the community from the rest of the network. 16 Also, let us define the segregation NI index S N I p to be equal to (4) above with the restriction that i has to be an NI agent:
The S N I p index captures the extent that network ignorant agents are segregated from other communities.
The concept of broker captures the idea of an agent that is on many paths connecting other agents. The betweenness centrality metric first defined by Freeman [1977] defines this notion more formally. Let η[p jk (g)] be the number of paths p jk (g) between j and k in the network g such that |p jk (g)| = d jk (g), i.e. such that the path length is equal to the geodesic distance between j and k. Also, let η i [p jk (g)] be the number of geodesic paths between j and k that pass through agent i, where i = j, k. The betweenness centrality I B (η i ) of an agent i is then equal to:
where j, k = i and j ∈ M p , k ∈ M q with q = p. A is just a normalization factor so that I B (η i ) ∈ [0, 1].
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Armed with these metrics it is now possible to give more formal definitions of what it means for a network to have segregation patterns and for an agent to be a broker. for every p = 1, ..., k and it has perfectly segregated NI communities if S
The first part of the definition says that a network with segregation patterns is formed by communities whose members connect mainly with each other. Moreover, in a network with perfectly segregated NI communities the NI agents do not form links with members of other communities.The second part says that the broker(s) in each community is the agent(s) with the highest betweenness centrality, i.e. the one(s) who is more crucial to give that community access to the individuals in other communities.
The following proposition shows that g CK networks have segregation patterns and perfectly segregated NI communities, and that having complete knowledge about the network structure is key to be a broker.
Proposition 4. All g CK cognitively stable network in proposition 2 are such that:
(i) they have segregation patterns and the minimum segregation index is
(ii) they have perfectly segregated NI communities (iii) the k brokers are the NC agents
The proof is by inspection of the g CK network architectures. Parts (ii) and (iii) tell a clear story: in each community the NI agents only connect with each other because their limited knowledge of the network structure does not allow them to see the benefits of connecting across communities, and therefore the only brokers are the NC agents. Thus, all g CK networks have segregation patterns. Moreover, the level of segregation is very high. The lower bound of 2 3 only applies to the limit case of communities of only 3 agents. Unless the communities are very small, the minimum level of segregation is much higher. For instance, if m = 10 then the minimum segregation index is 0.9; if m = 50 then the minimum segregation index is 0.98.
It is important to note that both heterogeneity in costs and heterogeneity in knowledge are important to obtain the results in proposition 4. Example 1 in section 3 shows that with heterogeneous knowledge and homogeneous costs the networks in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) are cognitively stable. These two networks have none of the properties (i)-(iii) above: both the black and white communities have zero segregation index and all agents are brokers. Example 2 in section 3 shows that with heterogeneous costs and homogeneous knowledge the network in Figure 1 (c) is cognitively stable: in this network the white community has zero segregation index.
Hubs
The majority of social networks have a degree distribution with a "long tail": there are a few agents, called hubs, who have a much higher degree than the other individuals in the network. Physicists have shown that this has important implications for many phenomena ranging from diffusion processes to the robustness of networks to random and targeted attacks.
18 The cognitively stable networks in this model do not have enough degree variation, so the overall shape of the degree distribution does not provide much information. However, for illustrative purposes, it is still useful to show that some stable networks in this model satisfy a stylized definition of a network with a hub.
Definition 4. An agent i is a hub in the network
Clearly, this is a basic and stylized definition which is also restrictive because it rules out the possibility of having more than one hub in a network. However, it has the advantage of being very clear-cut and of being very unambiguous in identifying as a hub the agent that satisfies it. The following remark points out that a simple inspection of the cognitively stable networks with a star kernel in corollary 1 reveals that all g SK networks have one hub as long as the number of communities is large compared to the number of agents in each community.
Remark 1. If k m then any g SK network has one hub, and the hub is an NC agent.
There are stable networks which have an agent with a much higher number of connections than all the other agents in the network. The hub is the central individual in the "super-community" of NC agents that connect different communities. To become the hub it is crucial to be one of the agents that have better knowledge about the network because only by connecting outside of one's community it is possible to have a number of links that is much larger than any other agent in the network. Finally, note that a network can be a small world without a hub (e.g. a large number of g CK networks), or, viceversa, it can have a hub but not be a small world (e.g. g SKS networks with λ ≈ 1), and it can also be a small world with a hub.
Conclusion
This paper has presented a strategic model of network formation where some agents have an incomplete and biased knowledge of the network structure. The specific mean degree bias that we investigate has been found by Dessi et al. [2012] in both experimental and empirical data. For a broad range of the parameters, the unique cognitively stable networks are such that (i) the average and maximum distance between any two agents in the network are similar to those in an equivalent random network; (ii) the clustering coefficient is significantly higher than in an equivalent random network; (iii) segregation patterns are a robust feature of stable networks, and (iv) the segregated communities are connected by the brokers who are the agents with complete knowledge of the network. Moreover, (v) some cognitively stable networks have one hub: an agent with complete knowledge of the network with a much higher number of connections than anyone else.
Both the heterogeneity in the knowledge of the network and the heterogeneity in the cost structure are key drivers of the emergence of properties (i)- (v) . The presence of agents with complete knowledge is key to shorten the social distance between individuals in the network, because these agents see the benefits of connecting otherwise separate communities. The presence of agents with incomplete knowledge is essential for segregation patterns to emerge. Moreover, the individuals with complete knowledge are the only brokers: they strategically position themselves to be at the center of the paths that connect different parts of the network. Finally, the hub is always an agent with complete knowledge because connecting to individuals in different communities is key to cumulating a very high number of connections.
The results in this paper should be relevant for applied work and practitioners of Organization Network Analysis (ONA), which is becoming a widespread tool to analyze and improve the performance of the informal component of organizations. Cross and Parker [2004] and other studies provide extensive evidence that the social network structure and the position of key individuals matter for individual and collective performance. Cross and Thomas [2009] , and a variety of firms providing tools and services to map companies' informal networks, claim that increasing employees' knowledge of the social network has a positive impact on performance.
Section 6 in Gallo [2009] , which is an extended version of this paper, investigates this claim in a specific case of the general framework. It shows that an increase in individuals' knowledge of the network weakly increases welfare. Furthermore, it is not necessary to feedback the results of an ONA to the whole organization: a more cost-effective approach of targeting a subset of employees would suffice to obtain the same positive impact on collective welfare. These results are also relevant in assessing the impact of the introduction of social networking tools, which increase individuals' knowledge of their social environment, in a society.
Our understanding of the way individuals perceive social structure is still very limited. This theoretical contribution shows that a specific bias in the perception of the structure of social networks, which has been validated both experimentally and empirically, plays an important role in understanding the emergence of the social networks that we observe in reality. Hopefully, this will motivate further empirical and experimental research to expand and deepen our understanding of the way we perceive social networks. After this process is completed, the ultimate goal will be to construct a general theoretical framework to model agents' incomplete knowledge of their social environment and to show its implications for individual behavior and economic outcomes.
A Appendix: Proofs
This appendix contains all the proofs omitted in the main body of the paper. The following terminology and concepts will be useful for some of the proofs. The marginal utility for an agent i from a set of links l i (g) in a network g is:
Following Bloch and Jackson [2006] , a utility function u(.) is superadditive in own-links if:
for all i, g i and
We will be using a weaker stability concept than cognitive stability, which we can dub pairwise cognitive stability to stress the analogy with pairwise stability from Jackson and Wolinsky [1996] . The graph g is pairwise cognitively stable if:
Hereafter denote by P S(u) and CS(u) the sets of all possible pairwise cognitively stable and cognitively stable networks respectively, where u(.) is the functional form of the utility.
Proof of Lemma 1. The strategy of the proof is to show that there is no pairwise cognitively stable network g with a link g ij such that i and j belong to different communities and i and/or j is a NI agent. By lemmata 2 and 3 it then follows that there is no cognitively stable network g with the above characteristics.
First, consider a community M p where the cost of forming links is c < b(1) − b(2). Clearly, all agents i ∈ M p are directly connected to each other, because if agents 1, 2 ∈ M p are not connected in g then mu i (g i + g 12 , g 12 ) = b(1) − c − b(2) > 0 for i = 1, 2 and therefore the agents would form the link. Now, let i ∈ M p be an NI agent, and let j ∈ M q , q = p. By definition of an NI agent, i will assume that any link g jk where k / ∈ M p is such that g i jk = 0. Thus, mu i (g i + g ij , g ij ) = b(1) − C < 0 and NI agent i will not form any link with agents in a different community.
Second, consider a community M p where the cost of forming links is b(1) − b(2) < c < b(1) − b(3), and therefore (a) there are no agents i, j, k such that g ij = g jk = g ik = 1. First, note that (b) all agents i ∈ M p are within a geodesic distance 2 of each other. This is because if agents 1, 2 ∈ M p are such that d 12 (g) > 2 then the minimum marginal utility they would gain by linking with each other is mu i (g i + g 12 , g 12 ) = b(1) − c − b(3) > 0 for i = 1, 2 and therefore they would form the link. Now, proceed ad absurdum. Let i ∈ M p be an NI agent and suppose that g ij = 1, (j ∈ M q , q = p). For mu i (g i , g ij ) < 0 to hold, the following conditions must be true: (c) there must exist an agent 1 such that g i j1 = 1 because C > b(1) + b(2) − b(3), and (d) there is no other agent l such that g 1l = 1 and g il = 1. Moreover, (e) 1 ∈ M p because i is NI. By assumption, |M p | = m p ≥ 3 and therefore there is another agent k ∈ M p that is connected to the network. Consider two cases.
(i) Suppose that g kj = 1. For j not to remove the links with i, k, 1, these agents must provide some indirect benefits. Thus, assume there are agents 2 ∈ M t and 3, 4 ∈ M r such that g i2 = g k3 = g 14 = 1. Now there are two cases to consider: t = p and t = p.
First, t = p. In order to satisfy (b) it must be that d 21 (g), d 2k (g) ≤ 2. By (d) we cannot have that g 21 = 1 and/or g 2k = 1. Thus, in order to have d 2k (g) ≤ 2, there must be one or more agents q such that g 2q = g qk = 1. However, if this were the case then mu j (g,
Similarly, in order to have d 21 (g) ≤ 2, there must be one or more agents q such that g 2q = g q1 = 1. However, if this were the case then mu j (g,
Second, t = p. For mu i (g i , g i2 ) < 0 to hold, the following conditions must be true: (c') there must exist an agent 5 such that g i 25 = 1, and (d') there is no other agent l such that g 5l = 1 and g il = 1. Moreover, (e') 5 ∈ M p because i is NI. By (b), agents 5 and k must be at most at geodesic distance 2. There are three possibilities:
Thus, if g kj = 1 then there is no possible stable network with g ij = 1.
(ii) Suppose that g ik = 1. By (b) it must be that d k1 (g) ≤ 2. By (d) we cannot have that g k1 = 1. Thus, it must be that there is an agent 2 such that g k2 = g 12 = 1. However, if this were the case then mu j (g, g jk ) = C − b(1) − b(2) + b(3) > 0. Thus, if g ik = 1 then there is no possible stable network with g ij = 1. 1, 2 ∈ M i are such that d 12 (g) > 2 then the minimum benefit to add the link g 12 is mu i (g + g 12 , g 12 ) = b(1) − c − b(3) > 0 for i = 1, 2 so they will form the link.
By lemma 1 the only agents forming links across communities are the NC agents. Moreover, the benefits to connecting to an NC agent are in the [B(1), B(1)] range. The maximum benefit to connecting to y i is when M i is a g C network and all agents are directly connected to y i , in that case the benefits are equal to B(1) ≡ b(1) + (m − 1)b(2). The minimum benefit is when M i is a g * network and all, except for one, agents are two links away from y i , in that case the benefits are equal to B(1) ≡ b(1)+b (2) Proof of Corollary 1. The proof is exactly the same as the one of proposition 1 except for the last sentence of the third paragraph (see above) that should now read "by lemma 4(ii) and since B(1) − B(2) < C < B(1) the kernel of NC agents is a d2 network."
Proof of Proposition 2. In the statement and proof of lemma 1, replace C > b L with C > b L + EB max . The proof of the lemma then follows un-changed. The proof of this proposition is then the same as the proof of proposition 1.
Proof of Corollary 2. Denote by g CKC and g CKS the subsets of g CK networks in which all communities are complete and star networks respectively. Note that if we show that the statement is true for any network in the g CKC and g
CKS classes then it is true for any network g ∈ g CK . First, let g ∈ g CK . The payoffs from the actual network for the NC agent i and the NI agent j are equal to: By inspection of the above expressions we have that if m > m(g ∈ g CKC ) then u i (g ∈ g CKC ) > u j (g ∈ g CKC ), and if m < m(g ∈ g CKC ) then u i (g ∈ g CKC ) < u j (g ∈ g CKC ). Second, let g ∈ g CKS . Here we have to consider two cases, depending on whether the NC agent is at the center of at the periphery of the star network. Denote by g CKSC and g CKSP the two subsets of g CKS in which the NC agent is at the center and at the periphery respectively. Consider first the case of g ∈ g CKSC , we have that: 
Comparing (8) and (9) we have that if m > m(g ∈ g CKSC ) then u i (g ∈ g CKC ) > u j (g ∈ g CKC ), and if m < m(g ∈ g CKSC ) then u i (g ∈ g CKC ) < u j (g ∈ g CKC ). Now consider the case of g ∈ g CKSP . Note that the NI agent may be either at the center or at the periphery of the star network. Denote by j and k the NI agents at the center and at the periphery of the star network respectively, we have that: 
Comparing (10) with (11) and (12) we have that if m > m(g ∈ g CKSP ) then u i (g ∈ g CKC ) > max{u j (g ∈ g CKSP ), u k (g ∈ g CKSP )}, and if m < m(g ∈ g CKSP ) then u i (g ∈ g CKC ) < min{u j (g ∈ g CKSP ), u k (g ∈ g CKSP )}.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider each part separately.
(i) By inspection of the g CK networks, the maximum geodesic distance between any k ∈ M i and l ∈ M j is when i = j and both k and l are NI agents in a d2 community who are not directly connected to the NC agent. Let g ∈ g CK be such that there are at least two communities M i and M j with such agents k and l. Let x i ∈ M i and x j ∈ M j be the agents that connect k and l respectively to the NC agents y i ∈ M i and y j ∈ M j . Then the shortest path between k and l is p kl = {g kx i , g x i y i , g y i y j , g y j x j , g x j l }, so M ax{D(g CK )} = D(g) = |p kl | = 5. (ii) By inspection of the g CK networks, it is evident that M in{d(g CK )} = d(g CKC ), i.e. the architecture with the shortest average path length is the network with complete kernel and complete communities. The closed-form expression ford(g CKC ) is:
The random network g random which is equivalent to g CKC has average geodesic distance approximately equal to:
It is straightforward to verify thatd(g CKC ),d(g random ) ∈ (1, 3) andd(g CKC ) ≈ d(g random ) for any parameter values of m, k satisfying mk = n < 10 5 . Clearly, the average geodesic distance of a network g CK (λ) with a fraction λ of high cost communities is increasing in λ: the more high cost communities there are, the higher is the average geodesic distance because high cost communities are less connected than low cost ones. Thus,d(g CK (λ)) ≤ d(g CKS ) = M ax{d(g CK )} for any λ, where g CKS is the network with complete kernel and star communities with the NC agents at the periphery. The closed-form expression ford(g CKS ) is:
M ax{d(g CK )} =d(g CKS ) = 1 m(mk − 1) mk(5m − 6) − (3m 2 − 2m − 2)
The random network g random which is equivalent to g CK (λ) has average geodesic distance approximately equal to: d(g random ) = log(mk) log((m + k − 2 + (1 − λ)(m − 1) 2 + λ(m − 1))/m) It is straightforward to verify thatd(g CKS ),d(g random ) < 5 for any parameter values of m, k satisfying mk = n < 10 5 . (iii) First, note that the g d2 networks with the lowest clustering coefficient are star networks since C(g * ) = 0. Thus, in order to find a lower bound for the clustering coefficient of any g CK network, assume that all g d2 communities are star networks. The following expression is the formula for the clustering coefficient of any g CK network with d2 communities that are star networks.
where µ (with 0 ≤ µ ≤ λ) is the proportion of communities that are a star community with the NC agent at the center. Proof of Proposition 4. Statement (ii) is a direct consequence of lemma 1. Let us prove (i) and (iii).
(i) By lemma 1 NI agents have segregation index equal to one. Each NC agent y p ∈ M p is connected to at least another agent i ∈ M p so the minimum segregation index for an NC agent is To obtain the lower bound on the minimum segregation index, let m p = 3 so that there is the minimum possible number of NI agents:
(iii) Let i ∈ M i be the NI agent with the highest betweenness centrality I B (η i ) among all NI agents in M i , i.e. η i [p kl (g)] > η j [p kl (g)], where j = i, y i , k ∈ M p , l ∈ M q , q = p. Consider the NC agent y i ∈ M i . Clearly, in any g CK network all the paths from k to l that include i have to include y i as well because that is the only agent in M i that forms connections with agents in other communities. Thus, η y i [p kl (g)] ≥ η i [p kl (g)]. Moreover, y i is also on the geodesic paths that connect i to agents in other communities, and therefore η y i [p kl (g)] > η i [p kl (g)]. Thus, I B (η y i ) > I B (η j ), ∀j ∈ M i , j = y i .
Proof of Remark 1. Let i be the center of the star kernel, then we have that min g SK {|L i (g SK )|} = k. Consider any j = i, then max i =j,g SK {|L j (g SK )|} = m. Clearly, i is the hub and by definition he is an NC agent.
